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Recently, the policy discussion has focused on heterogeneity of economic performance of
countries in the European Monetary Union (EMU). The mechanisms through which the
lack of °exibility based on national exchange rate and monetary policy may exacerbate
the e®ect of shocks is well known (see Mundell, 1961, and subsequent literature) and
the potential e®ect of common monetary policy on increasing divergence of economic
performance between countries belonging to the union have been widely debated in the
late nineties.
Now, six years after the establishment of the monetary union, with some real obser-
vations to analyze and with the Euro Area facing unsatisfactory growth performance,
the debate is having a second life. Heterogeneity is indeed the subject of this conference.
This paper looks at this issue from a narrow point of view. We analyze output
dynamics in member countries in the last thirty years and try to establish robust stylized
facts on output di®erentials within the union, the synchronization of recessions and the
relation with respect to the US. Recent developments, we argue, have to be understood
within the broader picture of the historical behavior of the European countries business
cycle and their relation with the US. The ambition of the paper is to organize the results
of a large empirical literature and bring some new evidence on our own to provide an
understanding of the stylized facts.
This analysis leads us to the following results. Output di®erentials, both in term of
levels and growth rate, have been remarkably stable over the last thirty years. However,
the business cycle have shown a high degree of synchronization: recessions have occurred
at similar dates and cross-country correlations have been stable and in line with those
found amongst US regions.
An analysis of the shocks suggests that heterogeneity is explained by small, but per-
sistent idiosyncratic shocks while output °uctuations are mainly explained by common
Euro Area shocks with similar propagation mechanisms. This indicates that the roots
of recent heterogeneity has to be found in national shocks, such as policies, for example,
that have a long lasting e®ect, but that are small when compared with common forces
of variation.
Our ambition is not structural here and this evidence is meant to provide food for
thought for a deeper analysis. Any structural analysis will have to match these two
facts: common dynamics and small and persistent idiosyncratic shocks. Persistence of
gaps in output per capita is explained, for Euro Area core countries, such as Germany,
France and Belgium by very long swings in the gap while for other countries, such as
Ireland, by convergence e®ects. Given the short sample we base this analysis on, it is
di±cult to assess whether, since the early nineties, with the deepening of the European
integration, convergence e®ects dominate.
When the Euro Area is analyzed as a whole and in combination with the US, it
appears that the two currency areas have a large component of their output °uctuations
in common. Fluctuations are generated by a world shock originating in the US, a shock
that Europe absorbs with a lag and with a response which is less volatile, but more
persistent. This is food for thought for a deeper understanding of international linkages:
what explains the di®erence between growth performance of the Euro and the US does
2not seem to be the nature of the shocks, but rather the propagation mechanism. This
result is based on a more detailed analysis in (Giannone and Reichlin, 2005) and is in
line with the literature that emphasized the importance of world shocks (eg. Kose
et al., 2003; Canova et al., 2004). However, it quali¯es that result showing US-Euro
Area di®erences in the propagation mechanism to the common shocks.
In the last part of the paper, we turn to the analysis of recent changes and we
ask whether, in faces of the output development just described, we have observed a
higher degree of risk sharing and therefore a higher degree of consumption cross-country
correlations conditionally on output. Our analysis follows Asdrubali et al. (1996) and
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2004). It points to evidence of a higher degree of risk sharing
which leads us then to conclude that EMU, and more generally European integration,
seems to have worked in the right direction. Obviously, whether this process will
eventually lead to higher growth in the aggregate is still unclear, but the understanding
of this link should be in the research agenda.
2 Output heterogeneity within the Euro Area
2.1 Synchronization of output levels, growth rates and
recessions
The literature has analyzed synchronization from di®erent points of views: levels,
growth rates, the unravelling particular episodes such as recessions, by using data
¯ltered so as to capture business cycle frequencies. However, not much has been done
to try to connect the ¯ndings from the di®erent perspectives. In this section we will
try to ¯ll this gap.
Level gaps
A ¯rst natural measure of asymmetry can be de¯ned looking at the di®erence between
output per capita in a member country and the average in the Euro Area.
De¯ne yi
t £ 100 as the log of real GDP per-capita of country (region) i in year t







is de¯ned as the percentage deviation of real GDP per-capita of country (region) i with
respect to the aggregate Euro Area (US) GDP per-capita.









3Table 1: Per-capita GDP at PPP and 2000 prices: gap with respect to Euro Area
AVE AVE AVE
1970 1980 1990 1999 2003 70-03 70-89 90-03 AR1
AT 6.32 13.13 12.88 16.49 15.67 13.18 11.90 15.01 0.81 *
BE 5.05 8.51 6.16 7.00 7.00 6.81 7.02 6.52 0.51 **
FI -2.00 2.89 7.77 3.57 8.05 2.54 3.77 0.78 0.88 *
FR 10.76 9.81 7.92 4.83 5.05 8.38 10.35 5.56 0.98
GE 5.54 4.55 5.04 3.63 1.53 4.47 4.15 4.92 0.90
GR -29.51 -21.33 -40.63 -41.28 -30.79 -31.85 -26.07 -40.12 0.94
IE -44.63 -40.13 -28.50 10.40 23.84 -25.72 -40.71 -4.30 1.07
IT 1.74 4.94 5.91 2.86 2.26 3.88 3.69 4.14 0.93
LU 34.23 25.07 47.79 65.91 72.24 43.60 31.86 60.37 1.04
NL 17.73 10.73 6.47 11.85 8.58 10.38 11.47 8.82 0.90
PT -57.78 -50.34 -40.59 -33.55 -37.06 -45.04 -50.65 -37.01 0.92
SP -25.61 -27.73 -23.23 -17.25 -13.64 -22.65 -24.68 -19.75 1.01
EU12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 31.80 19.43 13.78 16.26 15.57 19.90 23.23 15.15 0.88
SE 24.73 13.29 11.15 8.96 11.34 13.03 16.82 7.63 0.88
UK 6.71 -2.64 0.90 4.27 7.59 2.26 2.00 2.65 0.84
EU15 2.31 0.23 0.62 1.14 1.73 1.01 1.13 0.84 0.81
US 36.31 30.35 31.95 35.54 35.48 33.38 33.62 33.04 0.66 **
CA 19.48 18.73 12.79 12.89 15.98 15.93 19.25 11.20 0.90
JP -4.04 0.20 12.35 7.20 6.79 5.20 1.46 10.54 0.92
OECD 3.72 -0.13 0.84 1.58 1.94 1.43 1.70 1.04 0.61 **
The last column denotes the results from an ADL test for unit root.





The gap observed today (t+h) in a given country then depends on its initial (time t)
relative condition and growth performance in the past years up to today (t+1;:::;t+h).
We ask two main empirical questions. Do gaps persist in time? Have countries
changed their relative position?
Table 1 reports the gaps for Euro countries in the last 30 years. We also report gaps
for the US, Japan (JP), Canada (CA), and, respectively, the Euro twelve (EU12)1, the
European Union with the 15 members preceding the 2004 enlargement (EU15)2, and
the OECD countries for comparisons.
Table 2 reports the same gap statistics for the real personal income of US regions
with respect to the US average.3 We consider the following regions: New England
(NE),Mideast (ME), Great Lakes (GL), Plains (PL), Southeast (SE), Southwest (SW),
Rocky Mountain (RM), Far West (FW).
Table 1 shows that the gaps, with the exception of Ireland, have been remarkably
stable in the last thirty years. These gaps are also very persistent and there is no clear
sign of convergence to a common level of output per capita (again with the exception
of Ireland).
1Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (GE), Greece GR, Ire-
land (IR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherland (NE), Portugal (PT) and Spain (SP).
2EU12 plus Denmark (DE), Sweden (SE) and United Kingdom (UK).
3The use of personal income in Table 2 rather than GDP as in Table 1 will lead us to over-
estimate similarities between US regions and the US aggregates with respect to the European
nations case.
4Table 2: Per-capita Personal Income: Gap of US region with respect to US ag-
gregate
AVE AVE AVE
1970 1980 1990 1999 2003 70-03 70-89 90-03 AR1
US 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NE 8.45 4.97 15.37 17.03 19.02 11.50 7.98 16.53 1.00
ME 12.11 7.55 14.88 13.02 13.20 11.50 10.09 13.52 0.96
GL 2.61 1.70 -1.93 -0.08 -1.40 0.53 1.36 -0.67 0.94
PL -6.18 -5.66 -7.17 -4.40 -3.15 -4.47 -4.21 -4.83 0.55
SE -20.65 -15.65 -12.05 -10.99 -10.02 -13.61 -15.69 -10.64 0.92
SW -12.56 -4.30 -13.26 -10.41 -10.69 -9.69 -8.60 -11.24 0.91
RM -8.21 -3.04 -11.35 -5.83 -4.33 -6.59 -6.24 -7.07 0.93
FW 13.58 14.36 8.29 5.39 4.47 9.16 11.86 5.30 0.98
The last column denotes the results from an ADL test for unit root.
*, **, and *** indicate if the Unit Root is rejected at 10% and 5 % and 1% level respectively
A formal unit root test, whose results are shown in the last column, indicates that
for most European countries we cannot reject the hypothesis that the gap is non-
stationary and that therefore there is no common trend along which these economies
move.
Persistence in the gaps is generated by low frequency cycles around di®erent means
and, in the case of Ireland by a convergence trend. Given the persistence of the gaps
it is di±cult to distinguish whether, since the EMU, countries such as Spain or Greece
have been moving along a convergence path or are just in a phase of a long swing.
In general, on the basis of data so far, there is no clear evidence that the EMU has
modi¯ed the historical dynamics.4
To put these ¯ndings in a broader context, it is useful to look at the gap between
the US and the Euro Area average (Table 1) and the US regions and the US aggregate
(Table 2). From Table 2, we can see that the gaps between US regions and the US
aggregate, like the gaps between Euro Area countries and the Euro Area average are
non-stationary while, from Table 1, we had found that the gap between the US and
the Euro Area is. This fact suggests that it is indeed more likely for large economic
entities, which by virtue of size, are well diversi¯ed to move along a similar path over
a period of thirty years. Averaging output over nations/regions \kills" idiosyncratic
°uctuations, no matter whether they are persistent or not. To understand the economic
importance of this ¯nding, however, we need to estimate the size of this idiosyncratic
dynamic. This is what we will do in the next Section.
Growth gaps




4A separate literature has studied convergence dynamics within the Euro area (eg, Harvey
and Carvalho, 2005) and proposed formal statistical tests. This analysis is not the focus of this
paper.
5have declined over time and, in the last ten years, has reached an historical low (see
Table 3, column 1). This is not true, however, if we look at correlations between coun-
try's growth and Euro average growth, Corr(¢yi
t;¢yEU
t ). Since, as observed by many
studies (see Stock and Watson, 2005, for a review of the literature and an analysis based
on the G7), the variance of output per capita has decreased everywhere, a phenomenon
that has been labelled the \great moderation", correlations are more stable than the
variance of the gaps.
Table 3 reports variances of GDP growth rates, variances of the growth gap and cor-
relations between our selected countries and Euro Area GDP growth rates, for di®erent
sub-samples.
Table 3: GDP growth rate for OECD countries: descriptive statistics
(1) Var(¢yi
t ¡ ¢yEU




71-03 71-89 93-03 71-03 71-89 93-03 71-03 71-89 93-03
AT 1.24 1.96 0.38 2.86 3.56 1.32 0.76 0.68 0.84
BE 0.71 1.01 0.43 3.16 3.97 1.44 0.88 0.87 0.84
FI 7.31 3.57 1.17 8.46 3.79 2.18 0.38 0.43 0.68
FR 0.38 0.43 0.15 1.91 1.90 1.14 0.91 0.90 0.93
GE 0.71 0.64 0.06 2.91 2.79 0.94 0.87 0.88 0.97
GR 9.07 13.21 2.29 10.94 16.85 1.04 0.41 0.48 -0.20
IE 8.66 6.00 3.57 8.25 4.92 6.43 0.20 0.18 0.79
IT 0.88 1.19 0.26 3.21 3.97 0.82 0.85 0.84 0.85
LU 7.17 8.74 4.56 10.95 14.58 7.20 0.62 0.70 0.70
NL 1.03 1.01 0.90 2.49 2.69 2.69 0.78 0.80 0.87
PT 6.65 10.25 2.04 13.05 18.62 4.09 0.82 0.82 0.77
SP 2.00 3.15 0.24 4.05 5.71 0.87 0.71 0.67 0.86
EU12 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.05 2.29 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00
DE 2.72 3.53 1.07 3.58 5.02 1.70 0.54 0.56 0.62
SE 3.32 3.50 0.52 3.36 2.13 1.82 0.40 0.21 0.86
UK 3.21 3.22 0.44 3.81 5.10 0.63 0.47 0.61 0.71
EU15 0.10 0.10 0.01 1.85 2.21 0.77 0.97 0.98 0.99
US 3.25 3.69 1.03 4.16 5.83 1.33 0.51 0.61 0.54
CA 3.68 2.59 0.96 4.57 4.31 2.13 0.48 0.64 0.75
JP 3.32 3.16 3.41 4.47 4.37 2.19 0.53 0.55 -0.13
OECD 0.85 0.85 0.48 1.90 2.60 0.68 0.79 0.83 0.69
To control for the e®ects of the German uni¯cation, we do not include the period 1990-1992
in the sub-samples.
The table shows that cyclical co-movements, measured by correlations have been
high and stable within the Euro Area and between the Euro Area and the rest of the
world.
This ¯nding is in line with (Stock and Watson, 2005) who analyze the international
business cycle using di®erent measures and with the literature on the world business
cycle which has found that the international component of output °uctuations explain
a large part of total volatility (e.g. Kose et al., 2003; Artis et al., 2004; Canova et al.,
2004; Monfort et al., 2004). Simple correlation coe±cients, however, show that co-
movements within the Euro Area, are higher than between the Euro Area and the rest
of the world. This indicates that the Area wide aggregate captures the bulk of national
features and that we can identify speci¯c characteristics of the Euro Area business
cycle. This justi¯es the analysis of the aggregate European business cycle with respect
to the US which we carry on in Section 4.
6Recessions
Recessions are very informative events. In \normal times" volatility is relatively low
while a recession is a major event, characterized by an unusual drop in output. Are
Euro Area recessions synchronized? Harding and Pagan (2004) have recently proposed
an adaptation of the automatic algorithm designed by Bry and Boschan (1971) to
identify peaks and through of the European recessions of the last thirty years 5. Figure
1 reports their resulting dating for the Euro area and its largest member countries.
Figure 1: Euro Area Classical Reference Cycle and speci¯c cycles in GDP for
individual Euro Countries (Source: Harding and Pagan (2004))
The Figure shows that peaks and troughs of European countries business cycles are
basically concomitant.
Summing up
An apparent paradox emerges from a ¯rst look at the economic performances of Eu-
ropean countries: looking at levels of economic activity we would be led to think that
di®erences between countries are persistent while looking at growth rates or at the
chronology of the business cycle we ¯nd strong similarities. The explanation is that
cyclical asymmetries when measured in terms of levels of output, although persistent,
are small and in line with those between US regions.
In the next sub-section we will analyze the sources of asymmetries in more details.
5The Bry-Boschan algorithm is a non-parametric procedure deviced to identify local maxima
and minima and it is widely used in business cycle analysis.
72.2 What drives asymmetries: shocks or propagations?
Heterogeneous dynamics can be explained either by the exogenous sources of variation,
i.e. idiosyncratic, country-speci¯c shocks or by heterogenous responses to common
shocks. Which is the explanation for the heterogeneity found within the Euro Area?
To analyze this question, we estimate a set of bivariate structural VARs on output
per capita of country i and the Euro area average. The identi¯cation assumption is
that the country speci¯c shock a®ects the other member countries with a lag, one year,
i.e. we assume that spillover e®ects take at least one year to manifest6.
We will use the US as the usual benchmark and redo the exercise using regional

































where pi is the relative size of country (region) i measured as the ratio between county
(region) i population and the total population of the Euro Area (United States)7. As
in Section 2, The superscript AV indicates Euro Area (US) aggregate measure and the
uAV
t is the Euro Area Wide (US wide) shock while ui
t is the country (region) i speci¯c
shock8.
To understand which shocks are responsible for the asymmetries we will look at the











; h = 1;3;5










; h = 1;3;5
Euro Area
Table 4 below shows forecast error decompositions related to these two quantities for
the Euro Area.
6A similar identi¯cation strategy has been used by Stock and Watson (2005) to identify
country speci¯c and world-wide shocks among G7 countries.
7We use average population over the sample period 1970-2003.
8The VAR is estimated in levels to be robust with respect to unit root issues. Impulse
responses will be then computed for a medium run horizon.












h=0 h=1 h=3 h=5 h=0 h=1 h=3 h=5
AT 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.42 0.30 0.17 0.11
BE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.24 0.14 0.10 0.11
FI 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.84
FR 0.76 0.74 0.69 0.66 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.10
GE 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.39
GR 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.84
IE 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.82
IT 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.41
LU 0.78 0.76 0.71 0.67 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.36
NL 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38
PT 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.27
SP 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66
From the Table we can see that the gap is mainly explained by country speci¯c
shocks at all horizons. The latter, however, have had a limited role in explaining
output °uctuations, particularly at medium term horizon. Three exceptions stand out:
Greece, Finland and Ireland.
A further exercise is to run a counterfactual exercise and ask what would have
correlation been in the absence of country speci¯c shocks. Table 5 below provides the
answer.
Table 5: Counterfactual correlations
TRUE Only Area Only Country
Wide Shocks speci¯c Shocks
AT 0.76 0.94 0.20
BE 0.88 0.97 0.32
FI 0.38 0.96 0.07
FR 0.91 0.97 0.21
GE 0.87 0.88 0.35
GR 0.41 0.90 0.16
IE 0.20 0.34 -0.12
IT 0.85 0.98 0.31
LU 0.62 0.81 -0.11
NL 0.78 0.97 0.08
PT 0.82 0.99 0.15
SP 0.71 0.97 0.18
Clearly, correlations would have been quite high and stable if there had been only
area-wide shocks which implies that asymmetries are explained by idiosyncratic shocks
rather than heterogeneous responses to common shocks and that, therefore, area wide
shocks propagate similarly across Euro Area countries (with the exception of Ireland).
Again we ¯nd that, although small, national factors have persistent e®ects. Com-
mon Euro Area shocks account for the bulk of business cycle °uctuations.
The US
Table 6 and Table 7 below report results for the US regions from the same exercises we
performed for Euro Area's countries.












h=0 h=1 h=3 h=5 h=0 h=1 h=3 h=5
NE 0.96 0.94 0.90 0.84 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.16
ME 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.14
GL 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16
PL 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.36 0.28 0.18 0.14
SE 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.20
SW 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.38
RM 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.24
FW 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.22 0.19 0.14 0.11
Table 7: Counterfactual correlations
TRUE Only US Only Region
Wide Shocks speci¯c Shocks
NE 0.85 0.97 0.03
ME 0.91 0.99 0.11
GL 0.93 0.99 0.11
PL 0.80 0.99 0.09
SE 0.96 0.98 0.15
SW 0.77 0.97 0.12
RM 0.81 0.99 0.08
FW 0.92 0.99 0.15
Results are similar to the European case, although in the US the size of idiosyncratic
shocks is more homogeneous across regions than it is for nations within the Euro Area.
Three results emerge: (i) the gaps are mainly explained by region speci¯c shocks in
particular at medium horizons; (ii) output °uctuations are mainly explained by the US
wide shocks at all horizons; (iii) correlations would have been quite high and stable
if there had only been US-wide shocks, suggesting that US wide shocks propagate
similarly across US regions.
3 The Euro Area and the world
So far we have concluded that (i) the global component of the Euro area countries
°uctuations is large, but that (ii) Euro Area countries seems to be more correlated
amongst themselves than with the rest of the world.
To explore further this point, in this Section, we will develop a simple statistical
model to understand the relation between the Euro Area considered as an aggregate
and the US as a whole. This analysis draws from Giannone and Reichlin (2005).
Let us ¯rst start with some descriptive statistics.
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the Center for Economic
Policy Research (CEPR) provide a chronology for, respectively, the US and the Euro
Area business cycle. In both cases the chronology is established by informal inspection
of a variety of key macroeconomic time series and it is not just based on GDP. The
dates refer to what is typically called the classical cycle, i.e. the turning points in the
level of economic activity. Figure 2 plots quarterly US and Euro Area GDP since 1970
(the ¯rst date for which aggregate euro statistics are available) and dates established
by CEPR and NBER.
NBER and CEPR dating illustrate striking similarities between the cyclical char-
acteristics of the two economies. In both economies, recessions are rare and of short
duration if compared with expansions and they are roughly synchronized.
10Figure 2: GDP since 1970




























The light shadow corresponds to a recession in the US, the dark one to a recession in the
Euro Area and overlapping recessions show with an intermediate shade
We will now compute some descriptive statistics on duration, amplitude and syn-
chronization of cycles to document further similarities and di®erences between the
two business cycles. Table 8 reports statistics for the two classi¯cations of peaks and
troughs: the informal CEPR and NBER classi¯cation (bold ¯gures) and the dating re-
sulting from the application of the automatic algorithm designed by Bry and Boschan
(1971) to quarterly GDP9 (in parenthesis). Amplitude is measured as the quarterly
average growth rate of GDP during the sub-period, duration is measured in quarters
while the concordance index is a measure of synchronization developed by (Harding
and Pagan, 2004). Calling the log of US GDP as yUS
t and the log of Euro Area output
as yEU








t + (1 ¡ SyUS





is a binary random variable that takes the values unity during recessions and
zero during expansions. The concordance index ranges between 0 and 1.
The Table shows that, as suspected by inspection of Figure 2, there is high con-
cordance between the two cycles. However, in the US cyclical amplitude is larger and
9For the BB algorithm, we have applied the parametrization suggested by Harding and
Pagan (2002). We would like to stress that, following the tradition of Business Cycle dating,
quarterly GDP is not in per-capita for our dating exercise.
11Table 8: Business Cycle Statistics
US Euro Area
peak to trough amplitude -0.5658 -0.2433
(-0.6294) (-0.4979)
trough to peak amplitude 0.9445 0.7653
(0.9589) (0.6254)
peak to trough duration 3.4000 5.3333
(3.4000) (2.5000)
trough to peak duration 23.25 29
(23.500) (35.00)




The business cycle statistics corresponding to the NBER and CEPR dating are in bold.
We show in parentheses the same statistics, produced by the Bry-Boschan Dating Algorithm.
recessions are shorter than in the Euro Area. In general, the Euro area cycle seems to
be smoother than the US one.
The analysis in terms of growth rates brings further insights on di®erences and
similarities between business cycles. Since the growth of output is typically stationary,
growth cycle characteristics can be illustrated by looking at volatility, persistence and
dynamic correlations.
Volatility is typically measured by the variance of the growth rate of the series.
This is an average of the variance at all frequencies and therefore captures short-run,
medium/long-run and business cycle variance. The medium/long run, persistent com-









t+j; i = EU;US
Persistence can hence be measured as the ratio between the volatility of the medium/long
run component and the total volatility. Table 9 reports the variance of the growth rates
of output, the variance of the medium/long run component and the ratio between the
latter and the former for both the Euro and the US economy. We can observe the
following characteristics:
1. Total output volatility is higher in the US than in the Euro area.
2. Medium/long run output volatility is similar in the US and in the Euro Area.
3. The Euro cycle is more persistent than the US cycle. Persistence, as measured
12by the ratio between the variance of the medium/long run component and the
total variance, is larger in the Euro Area.
Table 9: Variance of the growth rate of output and of its 5 year centered moving
average
US Euro Area
(a) var[¢y] 4.50 2.00
(b) var[MA5(¢y)] 0.55 0.40
(c)=(b)/(a) £100 12% 20%
Di®erences in volatility and persistence characteristics of growth cycles between the
US and the Euro Area are the same as what observed for level cycles based on amplitude
and duration statistics. Larger persistence in the Euro Area is not surprising, since
recessions, as we have seen, are less pronounced, but last longer than in the US.
What about synchronization?
Figure 3 plots growth rates of GDP per-capita (upper quadrant) and its 5-years
centered average (lower quadrant) corresponding. The plot shows the the Euro Area
growth seems to \follow" the US's: the persistent component of output growth in the
Euro Area is lagging the US analog.
Figure 3: GDP growth rates and potential growth





















To understand whether this leading-lagging pattern implies a predictive relation
between US growth and Euro Area growth, we run a simple Granger causality tests
between growth rates of each area and the Euro Area-US gaps.
13Table 10: Granger causality test
F stat. p-value
¢yUS













t does not Cause ¢yEU
t 5.20 0.01**
The F-test does not reject the hypothesis that the Euro Area-US gap does not
Granger-cause (and is not Granger-caused by) US output growth. In addition, the
F-test does not reject the hypothesis that Euro Area output growth rate does not
Granger-cause the Euro Area-US gap but it does reject the hypothesis of Granger
causality of the gap on the Euro Area growth rate (results are reported in Table 10).
These results suggest a Euro Area - US dynamics whereby the Euro area rate of
growth adjusts itself to the US growth while the US does not, suggesting that the US
economy does not respond to shocks speci¯c to the Euro Area10.
More speci¯cally, the stationarity of the Euro Area - US gap, which indicate that
US output and Euro output are cointegrated, suggests a bivariate model on US and
Euro output with one common permanent shock. In addition the Granger causality
results suggest that the long permanent shock cannot a®ect contemporaneously the
Euro Area while it can a®ect immediately the US. We can label this shock as US shock
































On the basis of this model we can now compute impulse response functions of the
two shocks (the permanent (US) shock and the long-run neutral shock) on US output,
Euro Area output and Euro Area-US gap. Figure 4 plots the impulse responses while
Table 11 shows the variance decompositions.
Results imply that after a worldwide shock the US adjusts immediately while Eu-
rope reacts slowly reaching the steady state after more than 5 years. Notice also that
the other shock, the Euro Area one, is small and transitory. It explains less that 50%
of the variance of forecast error at 1-year horizon and less than one-third at 3-years
horizon.
If the non-neutral common shock is interpreted as the world technology shock this
result implies that the US economy has a higher ability to absorb technology faster
than the Euro economy. The high rapidity with which technology is absorbed in the
10Giannone and Reichlin (2005) use the restriction implied by the Granger causality tests
to simulate levels of output and verify whether it is possible to reproduce the properties of
the dating of business cycle identi¯ed from the data (see Table 8). They ¯nd that the model
reproduces them with a large degree of accuracy.
14Table 11: Real GDP per-capita: Forecast error decomposition% of forecast error
variance explained by the Worldwide (US) shock
Forecast horizon
0y 1y 3y 5y 10y
yUS
t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
yEU
t 0.35 0.62 0.85 0.92 0.96
yUS
t ¡ yEU
t 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Figure 4: Impulse responses









Impulse response to US shocks






















US seems to induce high short-term volatility. In the Euro Area, on the other hand,
the bulk of the variance is in the long-run because it takes longer to absorb shocks.
An alternative interpretation is that the world shock is in fact the US shock. The two
hypotheses cannot be distinguished statistically, but the economic implication of the
two alternative interpretations is the same.
To complete the exercise, we ask counter-factually, what would have the gap been
if there had only been worldwide shocks, and no Euro speci¯c shocks. Results are
reported in Figure 5.
We can see that the counterfactual and the actual gap are very similar. Moreover,
the gap decreases in recessions and increases in expansion which further illustrate our
characterizations of the two business cycles.
Collecting all results, we can conclude:
² The world-wide/US shock explains most of the °uctuations of the gap as already
15Figure 5: US/Euro Area Gap


















noticed by the literature on the world business cycle cited before.
² During recessions, the gap tends to close since Europe reacts slowly to the world-
wide shock. The gap opens during the expansions. In the middle of the cycle it
reaches its maximum, but then Europe starts caching up; and
² The Euro Area shock reduced the gap during the US recession of the 1990s,
probably as a result of the German Uni¯cation. However, the Euro Area shock
only postponed the European recession. Apart for this episode, the recent period
is very much in line with past experience (the variance of European speci¯c shocks
has not increased); and
² There is a speci¯c Euro Area cycle, which is di®erent from the US cycle because
of the di®erent propagation mechanism. This quali¯es the result by Canova et al.
(2004) and by Monfort et al. (2004) by distinguishing between origin of the shock
(worldwide) and propagation mechanism (Euro Area speci¯c).
4 Business cycle asymmetries and risk sharing:
should we care about output synchronization?
So far we have focused on the analysis of output and output per capita and we have not
looked at changes in these characteristics during the process of European integration
16and the establishment of the Euro. In fact, in terms of output there is no clear sign, or
at least not yet, of changes in the cyclical characteristics of the Euro Area.
In this section we will ask the question of whether the cross-country correlations
of consumption, conditionally on output have changed as the result of the deepen-
ing of the European economic integration. What matters for welfare is consumption
rather than output. In principle, ¯nancial market integration, should make it easier
for consumers, to insure against income risk through borrowing and lending and cross-
country ownership of ¯nancial assets. Sorensen and Yosha (1998) found that less risk
is shared in Europe than in the US while Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2004) found that risk
sharing through ¯nancial market has increased in the last decade thanks to ¯nancial
integration.
Table 12 shows some descriptive statistics.







71-03 71-89 93-03 71-03 71-89 93-03 71-03 71-89 93-03
AT 1.96 2.59 1.30 3.23 3.52 1.56 0.63 0.53 0.43
BE 1.10 1.74 0.41 3.25 4.53 0.65 0.82 0.81 0.65
FI 5.29 2.28 0.68 6.66 2.49 0.59 0.46 0.45 0.38
FR 0.70 0.67 0.41 1.49 1.69 0.75 0.78 0.80 0.69
GE 0.83 0.98 0.30 2.64 2.75 0.97 0.83 0.80 0.84
GR 4.24 6.59 1.52 5.91 9.11 0.53 0.53 0.54 -0.46
IE 8.75 9.27 2.98 9.74 12.48 5.00 0.33 0.54 0.79
IT 1.56 2.05 0.27 3.35 2.68 0.66 0.73 0.54 0.78
LU 4.49 0.86 1.44 5.50 1.78 1.75 0.44 0.75 0.43
NL 2.19 2.43 0.82 3.18 4.35 1.80 0.57 0.67 0.78
PT 10.27 16.55 1.49 13.36 20.50 2.98 0.51 0.49 0.81
SP 2.12 3.28 0.36 4.51 6.47 1.08 0.74 0.74 0.82
EU12 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.59 1.60 0.51 1.00 1.00 1.00
DE 3.59 3.65 2.71 2.83 4.01 1.72 0.19 0.39 -0.25
SE 3.63 3.83 1.42 4.63 4.54 1.80 0.48 0.43 0.46
UK 3.66 3.94 0.32 3.52 4.82 0.50 0.31 0.45 0.68
EU15 0.12 0.13 0.01 1.36 1.55 0.44 0.96 0.96 0.99
US 2.84 3.11 0.25 2.52 3.38 0.71 0.32 0.40 0.81
CA 2.86 2.40 0.67 3.55 4.18 0.53 0.48 0.65 0.36
JP 2.45 2.78 1.74 3.40 4.10 0.66 0.55 0.57 -0.49
OECD 0.76 0.69 0.21 1.16 1.58 0.35 0.73 0.78 0.77
Although the variance of consumption has been declining over time for all countries,
the correlation of country consumption growth with the average has increased for some
countries and decreased for others.
These numbers, however, cannot be simply interpreted: they are driven by many
factors, such as taste shocks for example. A more interpretable measure of risk sharing
can be obtained following Asdrubali et al. (1996), ASY from now on. We ask how
much variance of output is smoothed by consumption via risk sharing at each period
of time (see Sorensen and Yosha, 1998; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2004, for an analysis
on European countries), i.e. how much the cross-country variance of consumption
conditional on output has decreased over time. We consider the sample 1970-2004 and
redo some of ASY's calculations on our data.
Let us de¯ne: ci
t the log £100 of real individual consumption of country i in year
t. We estimate (by OLS) the regression:
¢h(ci
t ¡ cEU
t ) = ®t + ¯t¢h(yi
t ¡ yEU
t ) + vt
where ¢h denotes the h-th di®erences (1 ¡ Lh). The regression coe±cient ¯t is inter-
preted as the amount of risk not insured, i.e. the percentage of the variance of GDP
17that is smoothed out through capital market, credit market and other channels.
Figure 6 plots a smooth version of ¯t in time and for the EU12 countries, excluding












and m = 5 years.
Figure 6: Risk not shared over time







% of unsmoothed variance at different horizons
h=1
h=5
Results show that the ability of sharing risk among European countries goes up in
the early 90's when capital and good market integration has signi¯cantly accelerated
in Europe.
Although the previous calculations provide an interesting rough descriptive statis-
tics, a better measure of risk sharing should control for country heterogeneity in re-
sponse to common, Area-wide shocks and for the e®ect of relative prices. The hetero-
geneity of the responses of countries output and consumption to common shocks could
emerge in case of imperfect risk sharing11. In addition, relative prices °uctuations,
whose nature has changed signi¯cantly with the EMU, could have provided an auto-
matic smoothing of the e®ect of country speci¯c shocks12 (see for example Obstfeld,
11This approach to control for heterogeneity has been proposed by Giannone and Lenza
(2004).
12We thank Luca Dedola and Fiorella De Fiore for having suggested us to include this control
variable.
181994; Ho®mann, 2004).




t ) = ®i + ¯h¢h(yi
t ¡ yEU












t is the real exchange rate between country i and the Euro Area as a whole13
and Euro-area wide consumption is included as a regressor to control for common taste
shocks.
We follow ASY and estimate it using weighted least square so as to downweight
countries with a larger idiosyncratic component. We run the regression on all Euro Area
countries, excluding Luxembourg. As an alternative, we also estimate the coe±cients
including in our panel only the six largest Euro Area countries (Germany, France, Italy,
Spain, Netherlands and Belgium). Table 13 reports results.
Table 13: Panel estimates of ¯h for selected subsamples
EU 12 (excl. LU) EU (Largest 6)
h=1 h=5 h=1 h=5
1970-2003 0.75 (0.05) 0.77 (0.03) 0.83 (0.07) 0.94 (0.04)
1970-1989 0.80 (0.08) 0.87 (0.04) 0.86 (0.09) 0.91 (0.05)
1990-2003 0.65 (0.07) 0.59 (0.03) 0.70 (0.10) 0.65 (0.08)
1993-2003 0.76 (0.10) 0.59 (0.03) 0.77 (0.12) 0.63 (0.15)
Results from the simple measure of risk sharing are con¯rmed: risk sharing has
increased in the last decade. The result is particularly robust at long horizons, indi-
cating that the increased ability of countries to smooth is particularly signi¯cant in
response to persistent shocks to output. We should also stress that long horizons re-
sults should be more robust to endogeneity issues that may a®ect these types of reduced
form regressions.
We take the results above as an indication that the process of European integration
is working and we should worry less than before about asymmetries in output.
5 Conclusions
Six years of history of a monetary union are too short to identify new tendencies of
output development since historically gaps GDP per capita have been persistent and
it is di±cult to distinguish trends from persistent °uctuations around di®erent means.
However, these gaps are small and cycles are synchronized.
Heterogeneity is generated by small and persistent idiosyncratic shocks while most


















t are the nominal
consumption and the real consumption, respectively, in country i expressed in US dollars.
19is that that national stabilization policy don't have a large role to play in smoothing
output and, for the small part of variance generated by idiosyncratic shocks, they should
be designed to address low frequency components rather than the business cycle which
is mostly common.
What should be a concern for policy is the common characteristic of the European
cycle. When the Euro Area is analyzed as an aggregate and compared with the US, it
is found that, although a common world shock drives the two cycles, the propagation
di®ers across the two areas: the Euro Area lags the US and its cycle is more persistent,
but less volatile. Low growth, persistence of shocks and low volatility are common
characteristics of the Euro area and the gap with respect to the US has been stable
over the last thirty years.
Facing these historical characteristics, the process of European integration, has
however helped to smooth the cross-sectional correlation of consumption conditional
on output. This ¯nding supports the hypothesis that, since the early nineties, risk
sharing has increased within the Euro Area.
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